Introduction
Price discrimination allows firms to increase their revenue above what may be obtained from uniform pricing. The relative impact on consumers is, in general, ambiguous. Although nonuniform pricing is common, its welfare implications are an empirical issue about which little is known. The goal of this study is to undertake an analysis of the welfare implications of price discrimination, using the example of Broadway theatre. I present a model of individual consumer behavior and monopoly price discrimination, which is then estimated with data from a Broadway play. Using the estimated demand system, a range of counterfactual experiments are conducted to analyze the effects on welfare from price discrimination in this market.
The theoretical framework is a utility-based model of consumer behavior that incorporates characteristics suggested by the data and institutional details of the Broadway theatre industry.
The demand model is designed to be consistent with the observed behavior of the firm and includes both second-degree and third-degree price discrimination. 1 Setting different prices for different seat qualities is an example of second-degree price discrimination, or nonlinear pricing. 2 Discount mail coupons are targeted to consumers with lower willingness to pay, which provides an example of third-degree price discrimination, or market segmentation. The sale of day-ofperformance half-price tickets sold at a discount booth is modeled as a damaged good which further discriminates among self-selecting consumers.
The data consist of price and quantity sold for all 17 different ticket categories, for all 199 performances of Seven Guitars, a play that ran on Broadway in 1996. Variation in the price menu over time allows me to identify the cross-price elasticities that are needed to conduct the welfare analysis. The econometric specification of the behavioral model is a random-utility discrete choice model with endogenously random choice sets. A virtue of using a structural econometric framework in this case is that a range of experiments can be performed using the estimated demand system. An empirical investigation of the welfare implications of price discrimination must 1 Tirole (1988) gives a thorough discussion of the different kinds of price discrimination. Note that the analysis in this study would be the same regardless of whether I call it price discrimination, non-uniform pricing or multiproduct monopoly pricing.
2 Wilson (1993) provides a detailed account of the theory of nonlinear pricing. In this paper, the terms nonlinear pricing and second-degree price discrimination are used interchangeably.
rely upon an ability to analyze behavior with and without price discrimination, and to compute appropriate welfare measures. In the absence of data exhibiting both price discrimination and uniform pricing, it would not be possible to identify the difference in social surplus between uniform pricing and price discrimination without a behavioral model to form predictions. The experiments include uniform pricing, non-sticky prices over time, and abolishing the discount booth. In each case, comparisons are drawn with the benchmark scenario of the actual behavior of the firm and consumers.
Among the results, I find that the observed price discrimination increases the firm's profit by 5%, relative to a policy of optimal uniform pricing. The gain from price discrimination significantly depends on the magnitude of the discount which is offered for tickets sold at the day-of-performance discount booth. In particular, if the booth discount were 30% instead of 50%, firm profit would rise by 7%. From the point of view of consumers, the change in aggregate consumer surplus under price discrimination relative to uniform pricing is insignificant, though there is a redistribution of surplus among consumers. I also show the increase in profit from reoptimizing prices in the face of changing demand is less when a menu of several price alternatives is used than when a single price is used each period, which may help explain the presence of rigid price policies in this market. 3
The empirical literature on price discrimination has evolved over the last ten years. First are the studies by Borenstein (1991) and Shepard (1991) which identify the presence of price discrimination from possible cost-based explanations for the observed price dispersion. Then Borenstein and Rose (1994) quantify a high degree of price dispersion due to price discrimination, that is all the more interesting given the somewhat competitive nature of the industry they study (airline travel). A few more recent studies employ structural methods to investigate a variety of issues in relation to price discrimination-see Ivaldi and Martimort (1994) , Bousquet and Ivaldi (1997) , Cohen (2000) , McManus (2000) and Miravete (2000) . Of these papers, Cohen (2000) and McManus (2000) analyze the welfare effects of price discrimination relative to uniform pricing, as I do here. In the cultural economics literature several researchers have analyzed theatre demand and pricing and two of these studies focus on the presence of multiple ticket prices. Huntington (1993) investigates whether revenue differs for theatres charging a range of ticket prices, over theatres that charge a single price for all tickets. In a theoretical study, Rosen and Rosenfield (1997) describe a model of ticket pricing that involves second-degree price discrimination. Finally, several previous studies have estimated price and income demand elasticities for the performing arts, as I do here also. 4
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 the data are summarized with particular attention given to aspects that are explicitly incorporated in the model. The behavioral model and the econometric model are presented in Section 3. Section 4 contains the results of the estimation, including the implied demand elasticities. Based on the estimated demand model an array of experiments are explained and the results presented in Section 5. The paper concludes in Section 6.
Summary of the Data
Broadway theatre refers to all plays and musicals performed in theatres in the Times Square region of Manhattan, New York, which have seating capacities in excess of 499. Typically, the owner of a Broadway theatre rents the theatre to a show producer who decides, among other things, the ticket prices for the show. In contrast to most performing arts organizations the objective of Broadway theatre producers is to maximize profit. Ticket prices are not subject to any specific regulation. The majority of tickets are sold over the phone. 5 Some tickets are also sold at the box-offices located at the theatres, or through two discount-booths located in Manhattan known as the TKTS. The Broadway play that is the focus of this study is Seven Guitars.
Each Broadway show develops its own idiosyncratic approach to the marketing of their product, however with respect to price discrimination Seven Guitars is a typical example of behavior in the industry. 6
Seven Guitars provides an ideal example of discriminatory pricing. Unlike other examples of price dispersion for Seven Guitars there is no doubt that the price differences which are evident in a given performance cannot be explained by differing costs-the marginal cost of every ticket sold for a given performance is effectively zero. Moreover, while the number of seats in the theatre presents a capacity constraint for the firm, suggesting the presence of a variable An important distinction among ticket categories is between full-price tickets and discountprice tickets. Full-price tickets are for a specific area of seating, namely orchestra, mezzanine, rear-mezzanine, balcony, boxes and standing room. These regions are differentiated by the average quality of the seating, or view, that is offered. All full-price options are available to all potential consumers and are sold via telephone. Discount-price tickets are available under various conditions. Some discount-price tickets are only available to individuals who receive a coupon in the mail or happen to come across one in a restaurant or some other chosen location.
Another kind of discount, while available to all potential consumers, requires consumers to incur a non-pecuniary cost of having to wait in line at a discount booth. For discount-price tickets, the buyers are seated in the high quality region of the theatre, though generally not in the best seats in that area. per cent of the mean price. By way of comparison, in a study of prices in the airline industry by Borenstein and Rose (1994) , they find an average (across flights) Gini coefficient of .181
(standard deviation .063) which implies the expected absolute difference between any two fares selected at random is 36 per cent of the mean fare.
Rather than attempt to estimate demand for all ten of the discount ticket categories, I
distinguish only two types of discounts. The first type is booth discount sales and corresponds to the TKTS category in the data. The defining characteristic of booth sales that I seek to incorporate in the demand model is that consumers must physically attend the booth on the day of the performance to purchase tickets. Despite having a telephone sales mechanism already available for the sale of tickets, the theatre producer chooses not to use this mechanism for discount sales on the day of the performance, instead forcing consumers to incur the disutility associated with purchasing a ticket at the booth. The firm has deliberately damaged their product, making the good less attractive than it would otherwise be. This would be an example of a damaged good as modeled by Deneckere and McAfee (1996) . But the conventional damaged goods explanation is not entirely adequate in this case. If the point to using the booth is to define an additional quality of seating, then why doesn't the firm simply create a further quality division within the theatre and sell tickets for these seats over the phone? Indeed this approach should be preferred since no disutility from attending the booth is incurred, and greater surplus may be extracted from consumers. In the model presented in Section 3, booth sales are characterized as a damaged good, where the amount of damage to each consumer depends on the consumer's type. 7 This variation on the Deneckere and McAfee approach to damaged goods leads the producer to prefer using the booth mechanism over the obvious alternative of discount phone sales on the day of the performance, since the latter involves no type-dependent cost.
The second kind of discount that is included in my analysis is advance-purchase discount sales. Here, I aggregate all discount categories excluding TKTS, wheelchair and complimentary 7 Specifically, there is a time cost of attending the booth which is increasing in the individual's level of income.
tickets. The advance-purchase discount categories are equivalent to coupon sales, where the coupons are targeted to a subset of the potential consumers. 8
There are two types of price variation contained in the dataset. First, both absolute and relative prices for the full-price ticket categories vary across performances within a week. For example, the price of orchestra tickets on Saturday evenings is $60, for the same ticket on a
Tuesday evening the price is $55, and for a Wednesday matinee is $45. From week to week, this pricing pattern does not change. However, the price of advance-purchase discount tickets varies from week to week (indeed from performance to performance) as the availability of different discounts changes over time, which is the second source of price variation.
In addition to the price and quantity data described above, I observe variables that help to capture shifts in demand for Seven Guitars. One such variable is daily advertising expenditures.
A total of $878,337 was spent on advertising, amounting to 20% of the show's running costs, or an average of more than $30,000 per week during the 25 weeks of performances. The disaggregated data covers advertising in newspapers, magazines, travel guides and theatre guides; on billboards and bus shelters; on radio; and on cards in restaurants. The majority of advertising expenditures was with the New York Times (62.7%), mostly as graphical display advertisements in the Sunday edition (29.7%). For the purpose of this study the data is aggregated into a scalar variable intended to measure the daily level of advertising. I take the level of advertising for each separate form of advertising to be equal to the dollar expenditure. 9 To correct for the fact that a particular advertisement is seen by people on days other than the first day it appears, each advertising expenditure is uniformly distributed over the duration of the publication.
Seven Guitars was performed in the Walter Kerr Theatre and I use information on the seating in this theatre for the estimation. In particular, the manager of the box office at the Walter Kerr assigned every seat in the theatre a rating from one to ten, based upon his experience of people's preferences when buying tickets, to reflect the quality of the view from each seat. From 8 For example, Lincoln Center (a well-known performing arts organization in New York with a subscriber base of approximately 28,000 people) sells one-time use of their mailing list at the price of the coupon ticket for every one hundred names. To further enhance targeting, the mail-out may also be limited to particular zip codes. See Shaffer and Zhang (1995) for an analysis of coupon targeting. 9 This reflects the principle of the marginal dollar spent on each form of advertising on any given day having an equal effective advertising value, while ignoring the advertising value of infra-marginal expenditures.
this procedure it is apparent that there is significant variation in seat quality within the area deemed as the high quality region, while for the medium quality and low quality regions there is insignificant variation in seat quality across seats within each of the regions. The capacity of the high quality region is 755; for the medium quality region the capacity is 126; and the capacity of the low quality region is 66.
From Variety Table 2 . Consistent with the data I allow for three quality-differentiated full-price ticket options. The three regions are labelled high quality, medium quality and low quality. All individuals prefer higher quality seats, but differ in their willingness to pay for higher quality. As previously discussed, all seats in the high quality region of the theatre do not provide equivalent seat quality. Indeed there appears to be fairly significant variation in quality within the high quality region which is likely to play an important role in consumers' decision-making. For the low quality and medium quality categories the assumption of equal seat qualities within each region is a good approximation. Each quality region also has a capacity constraint.
The presence of both capacity constraints and quality heterogeneity within the high quality 10 For a detailed discussion on the perception of show quality in relation to the demand for theatre, see Throsby (1990) .
region lead me to incorporate rationing in the model by arranging consumers in a random sequence. Specifically, M potential consumers are in a random sequence {(
Following the order of the sequence, consumers are individually presented with their choice set, and depending on their decision the choice set for the next consumer in the sequence may be modified-an option may be removed because a capacity constraint has been reached, or the best available seat in the high quality region may have a lower quality. Consequently, the seat quality that is offered to individual i in the high quality region depends on the number of seats in the high quality region that are sold to individuals ahead of individual i in the sequence. 11
Let q ih denote the quality of seat, or view, that is associated with the high quality full-price ticket option for individual i, and let q im ≡ q m and q il ≡ q l denote the seat quality for medium quality and low quality full-price ticket buyers.
Subject to availability, the net utility to individual i from choosing a full-price ticket for seat quality j ∈ {l, m, h} is given by
in which B(y i ) ≤ y i is individual i's budget for entertainment expenditures, p j is the price of the ticket, and η is a parameter. 12 With this formulation consumers' marginal utility from seat quality depends on their level of income, leading to a self-selection process in which high income individuals choose high quality seats and low income individuals choose low quality seats. The function B contains parameters that allow me to estimate the appropriate proportion of income that is relevant for individuals' entertainment expenditure decisions. 13 I use a specification that allows for wealthier people to spend a greater absolute amount of income on entertainment, but a lower proportion of their total income, than less wealthy individuals. Specifically,
where δ 1 > 0 and δ 2 ∈ (0, 1] are parameters. Individuals first decide how much income to 11 I assume seats are allocated in order of best to worst. 12 An obvious alternative to the functional form in equation (1) is an additively separable specification. However, for such utility functions, in the presence of a continuous distribution of consumer types, a revenue-maximizing firm typically prefers to offer only the high quality good. With this specification, in general, the firm optimally chooses to offer many different quality levels. Note also, the model does not allow consumers to decide when they will see the play. While in reality consumers may substitute weeknights for weekends for example, this aspect of behavior is abstracted from in the belief that it is of second-order importance in my context. 13 An alternative approach is to include a coefficient on price which would increase the disutility of price.
allocate to entertainment and perhaps other categories such as clothing, travel, savings, and so forth, and then subsequently decide how to spend their entertainment budget on the various possibilities which include this play. 14 In addition to the above full-price ticket options, with probability λ(y i |γ) consumer i receives a coupon which can be used to purchase a ticket for a high quality seat at price p c < p h , and obtain utility
The density λ(y i |γ) is the outcome of some coupon technology available to the firm. The parameter γ corresponds to the efficiency of the coupon technology (ie. how accurately coupons are targeted to low income individuals). 15
Consumers also have the choice of going to a discount booth at which they can purchase a ticket for one of the high quality seats that remain after all individuals have had an opportunity to purchase a full-price seat. The booth-ticket quality is denoted as q ib . I assume there is a time-cost for having to physically attend the booth. 16 In particular, the utility from purchasing a booth ticket is given by
where τ (y i ) ≥ 0 is an increasing function that represents the time-cost of attending the booth.
I adopt a simple linear specification for the cost of attending the booth. The essential feature is for this cost to depend on individuals' income levels:
where τ 1 ≥ 0 and τ 2 are parameters to be estimated.
The firm's motivation for selling tickets via the discount booth can now be clarified. The firm would like to first sell as many full-price and coupon tickets for the high quality region as 14 One set of assumptions which would permit two-stage budgeting in this context is if the overall utility function is additively separable in the utility from consuming entertainment, and if the prices of all goods in the entertainment category move in proportion to one another. See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) . 15 While each individuals' level of income is private information, the firm contracts a third-party, who possesses private signals about each individuals' level of income, to disseminate coupons. 16 From the data, qm ≤ q ib for all i, while p b = pm. The time-cost is needed to provide an incentive for individuals to choose medium quality full-price tickets over booth tickets which are the same price and for higher quality seating.
possible. The remaining seats in the high quality region are then sold for a substantial discount since they have zero marginal cost. Of course booth sales have the potential to undermine the firm's ability to sell full-price tickets in the first place. This would be an example of the well known Coase conjecture. 17 Some consumers are deterred from the strategy of not buying a full-price ticket and instead waiting to buy a booth discount ticket by two factors. First, there is a time cost of attending the booth which is higher for high income people. Second, full-price ticket buyers are assigned to the best seats in the high quality region, while booth ticket buyers are assigned to the worst seats in the high quality region.
To complete the choice set I specify the utility from the outside alternative. 18 The goal here is to provide a specification which acts as a reduced-form valuation of the highest utility that may be obtained from seeing another show, and which also gives rise to sensible substitution patterns. I assume the utility from the outside option is given by
where p o is the price of the outside option and η o is a parameter. By including heterogeneous valuations of the outside alternative the aim is to partially capture the presence of competing firms. 19 Doing so requires not only that the value of the outside alternative be correlated with the value of the inside alternatives, but that individuals also vary in their relative-taste for the outside option-as if the outside alternative represents a set of vertically differentiated seat-qualities for a horizontally-differentiated show. 20
17 According to the Coase conjecture, when consumers have the choice of when to purchase from a monopolist, the monopolist today, in effect, competes with itself in the future.
18 As previously noted, the outside alternative is seeing another Broadway show. The main reason for interpreting the outside alternative in this relatively narrow way is because I have data on the number of people who attend Broadway theatre at the same time that Seven Guitars was on Broadway. Hence, given this interpretation, I observe the number of individuals that in fact choose the outside alternative. 19 The common practice in discrete choice demand models is to normalize the utility of the outside alternative to zero, for all individuals. When a demand system concerns primarily horizontally differentiated products, zero outside utility may not be such a bad assumption. But when the demand system concerns primarily vertically differentiated products, as it does here, zero outside utility would imply unreasonable substitution patterns. The problem is most easily seen in a case where the relative value of the outside alternative increases by small amount (a negative demand shock to the industry), which results in consumers switching from the low quality inside alternative only. Whereas in reality, consumers would switch from the high quality inside option to the outside option also, but the model does not allow this. 20 In this respect I draw on the approach of Stole (1995) who provides a theoretical analysis of oligopoly nonlinear pricing, where individuals similarly possess both horizontal and vertical preference heterogeneity.
To summarize, the utility for individual i from product j, assuming this individual received a coupon, is given by
If an individual did not receive a coupon, their utility function is the same except that it excludes choice j = c. 21 The expected demand for tickets in category j is equal to
where A j is the set of consumer types who most prefer option j. More formally,
where Ω = {l, m, h, c, b, o}.
I defer the explanation of the firm-side of the the model to the section on counterfactual experiments (Section 5), where it is used. I make no assumptions on the firm's behavior which are incorporated in the estimation of the demand system. This helps to limit the possible sources of misspecification in the estimated model.
Econometric Model
The behavioral model described above is an example of a discrete choice random utility model with endogenously random choice sets. 22 The model is estimated using a maximum likelihood estimator. I now detail distributional and other assumptions that are needed for estimation of the econometric specification of the behavioral model.
The distribution of potential consumers' income is estimated based on the survey by the League of American Theatres and Producers. The data consists of the proportion of people 21 Or equivalently, assume Uic ≡ 0. 22 The choice sets are random because an individual has a coupon with only a certain probability. In addition, the choice sets are endogenous because the choices available to an individual depend on the optimal choices of individuals ahead in the sequence.
attending Broadway theatre in 1990-91 with annual family income within n intervals. The intervals are inflated to 1996 levels using the Consumer Price Index, and a log-normal distribution is fitted using a minimum distance estimator. The results are reported in Table 2 . The distribution of individuals' tastes for the show may change from performance to performance. I assume an exponential distribution,
in which the vector X t = {constant, advertising, dummy for before the Tony Awards, various day-of-performance dummies, number of other Broadway shows in the same week, time} and β is a parameter vector. 23
For the probability density of receiving a coupon I assume the following specification:
where Z t = {constant, dummy for performances when Manhattan Theatre Club members were allowed to attend, various day-of-performance dummies, time, time-squared} is a vector of data.
This density has the appearance of a backward "s", giving a high probability of receiving a coupon when y i is low, and a low probability when y i is high. The vector γ is a parameter vector representing the number of coupons the firm sends out. I interpret the scalar α as a coupon efficiency parameter-higher values of α imply a less efficient coupon technology (that is, a greater probability of wealthy people receiving a coupon).
The capacities of the three seating regions are denoted by C l , C m and C h . Once the capacity of any region is reached within a sequence of simulated consumers, the option is no longer available for subsequent individuals in the sequence. Let k ijt denote the number of tickets purchased by consumers ahead of individual i (in the sequence) for region j in performance t.
Then tickets for category j are only in the choice set if k ijt ≤ C j . To compute the seat quality in the high quality region of the theatre that is offered to individual i, I use the distribution of rankings, and assume the difference between consecutively ranked seats, within the high quality region, is the same, no matter what their rankings. Since the high quality region adjoins the 23 For simplicity the income and taste distributions are independent. Since the outside alternative is seeing another Broadway show. To the extent that I have a prior on the correlation between F and G, my prior is that they are independent. I see no compelling reason to believe that income and the taste for this particular play would be correlated.
medium quality region, I also assume the medium quality is uniformly different from the worst seat in the high quality region. For the low quality seats, I allow for an arbitrary difference in quality, since these seats are physically separate in the upper balcony. Given these assumptions, I therefore estimate the quality of the best seat in the house (Q max ), the medium quality level (q m ) and the lowest quality seat (q l ).
Conditional on an individual receiving a coupon, the utility specification that is the basis for estimation is given by:
If the individual does not receive a coupon, the utility function does not include the choice j = c.
The choice set for each individual is a random event that depends on the exogenous probability of receiving a coupon and the endogenous behavior of other individuals in the market.
The set of parameters to be estimated is Θ = {q l , q m , Q max , δ 1 , δ 2 , τ 1 , τ 2 , η, η o , p o , α, β, γ}.
Noting that the distribution of individuals' income is separately estimated, the predicted market share of product j ∈ Ω, in period t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, conditional on all parameters, is computed by
Denote the actual number of individuals who choose option j in period t as N jt ; where the number of individuals choosing the outside alternative is determined by
The market size, M t , is the total number of people attending Broadway theatre in the same week, divided by the typical number of performances for each show of eight. The log-likelihood function can now be stated:
The vector of estimated parameters, θ * , is the value of θ that maximizes equation (3).
In the econometric model, as in the behavioral model, the only sources of uncertainty are from the individuals' unobservable heterogeneity. There is no additional logit, probit or other such error term. All of the stochastic elements in the econometric model have specific interpretation within the behavioral model. This limits the model's ability to explain discrepancies between predicted behavior and actual behavior. 24 To compute the optimal parameter values I use a non-derivative simplex search algorithm. The random sequences are simulated which introduces a source of simulation error to the estimates. 25
Empirical Results
To estimate the model several normalizations are imposed. The quality level of the low quality seats is set equal to one (q l = 1). It appears from the estimation that η and η o are not separately identified, rather that only the difference between the two parameters is identified. I therefore set η o = 1. Since I have no data on the number of coupons which were sent out, I set the value of α to 0.01. Finally, the price of the outside alternative appears to be poorly identified by the data, so this is set to zero, p o = 0. 26 The remaining 28 parameters are estimated.
Observations for opening night of Seven Guitars are not used in estimation since the large number of complimentary tickets on that night (572) suggests an aberration. This leaves 198 performances.
The estimated parameters are shown in Table 3 . The quality parameters, q m and Q max 24 An unlikely data point, in the current model, can be explained by either the uncertainty of income or the uncertainty of the taste for the play. Adding an additional error term would be a generalization that provides another source of explanation for an unlikely data point, and will have the affect of smoothing the likelihood function. Whether additional error terms would improve the model is not clear. An implication of the limited sources of error in the model is the low standard errors that arise from estimation in the next section. 25 See Pakes and Pollard (1989) and McFadden (1989) regarding the use of simulation methods with extremum estimators such as that used here. 26 Since I have no comparable data on the price of the outside alternative, I must estimate or normalize po. If the actual price of the outside alternative is correlated with the ticket prices for this show, as one might expect, then normalizing the price of the outside alternative will lead me to underestimate the sensitivity of aggregate demand to price changes.
should be gauged with respect to the normalization for q l . The estimates imply the best seat in the house is 3.3 times better than the worst seat in the house. With the typical price for low quality seats of $15, and for high quality seats of $55, highest quality buyers pay 3.66 times more for a seat that is 3.3 times higher quality. At the mean weekly income level of $2,227.10, the implied budget for entertainment expenditures is $75.69, or 3% of weekly income. The cost of attending the booth is implied by the parameters τ 1 and τ 2 . The type-dependent component of the cost depends on τ 1 , with the estimated parameter implying that the cost of attending the booth rises by almost 0.7 of a cent for every additional dollar of weekly income. Thus, for example, the cost of attending the booth for an individual with the mean level of family income is estimated to be $12.11, which seems reasonable.
The estimated parameters for the distribution of individuals' taste for this play are given in Table 3 To help assess the model's fit, Figure 1 presents histograms of the differences between predicted and actual behavior. In Figure 1a is a histogram of the percentage differences between the number of predicted high quality ticket sales and the actual number of high quality sales in each performance. It is apparent that the model predicts high quality sales to within roughly 50% of the actual number in a large proportion of performances, while also exhibiting a tendency to over-predict. The equivalent figures for low quality, booth and coupon sales appear as Figures 1b, 1c and 1d , respectively. Of these cases, booth and coupon sales appear to be the best predicted ticket categories, with the majority of performances predicted to within roughly 50% of the actual number of sales.
Own-price, cross-price and income elasticities are presented in Table 4 . These are obtained by computing predicted market shares under the empirical prices and comparing them to predicted market shares following a one per cent increase of the relevant ticket price. The price elasticities are computed with and without capacity constraints. 27 Turning first to the capacity-constrained price elasticities. As expected for a monopolist the own-price elasticities are almost all greater than one. The exception to this is low quality seats, which is due to poorly predicted low quality ticket sales reaching the capacity constraint in 182 (out of 199) performances. Actual low quality ticket sales sell out in only 23 performances. High quality tickets are the largest revenue category of sales, and the estimate of the own-price elasticity for these tickets is -2.5.
The column on the far right of Table 4 takes into account the fact that booth tickets are always sold at 50% off the price of high quality tickets. Thus, elasticities in this column are based on 1% increases in both high quality and booth ticket prices. As expected, this reduces the sensitivity of both high quality ticket and booth ticket buyers since there is a diminished incentive to switch from high quality to booth, or from booth to high quality. In addition, the magnitude of the cross-price elasticities on the other categories increase; for example the elasticity of coupon sales with respect to the high quality price rises from 0.98 to 1.53, and with respect to the booth price rises from 0.55 to 1.53.
A striking feature of the cross-price elasticities with capacity constraints is that several of them are negative. In the behavioral model, all tickets are substitutes for one another which ordinarily implies positive cross-price elasticities. The reason for the negative cross-price elasticities is because the capacity constraints cause some consumers to select their second or lower ranked alternatives. For example, increasing the price of low quality tickets causes some individual to no longer purchase a low quality ticket, making the ticket available for another individual who may have purchased a medium quality ticket only because there were no low quality tickets available previously. In this way, increasing the price of a capacity-constrained category can lead to fewer sales in other categories. To confirm this, I compute price elasticities for the demand system with no capacity constraints, as also reported in Table 4 . In this case, all cross-price elasticities are indeed positive. Table 4 also reports the implied income elasticities for the estimated demand system. Rather than interpret the negative income elasticities on the booth and coupon tickets as evidence 27 When there are no capacity constraints a consumers' choice set is not affected by the choices of others ahead in the sequence.
of inferiority, we again see the capacity constraints causing substitutions which underly these income elasticities. Note that the elasticities are computed based on a 1% increase in weekly family income, and that this will translate into a less than 1% increase in each individual's entertainment budget. In any event, high quality ticket sales appear to be highly sensitive to income, while lower quality seats are less so.
Counterfactual Experiments and Welfare Analysis
In this section I describe several experiments based upon the estimated demand system. The experiments consider how consumers would respond to various counterfactual pricing regimes, as well as allowing the firm to re-optimize the price menu. The demand system has been estimated without any assumptions on the behavior of the firm. Such assumptions can provide nonlinear restrictions on the estimated parameters in order to enhance the accuracy of the estimates, but at the cost of increasing the possibilities for misspecification. The parameter estimates presented in the previous section are, generally speaking, already very precise. To establish that the model is well specified I compute the implied optimal behavior of the firm under assumptions which resemble circumstances in the industry. This procedure also provides a benchmark for counterfactual experiments. I first discuss the benchmark analysis and then the various experiments. All results are contained in Table 5 and will be discussed in turn.
The firm's problem is to choose prices, p = {p l , p m , p h , p b , p c }, to maximize expected income:
where t is a performance index and T is the total number of performances (all other variables are defined in the behavioral model, above.) 28 Since I do not allow the firm to choose the quality levels q l , q m and q h , the firm-side of the model considers only one component of the standard models of second-degree price discrimination in which the firm chooses both qualities and prices. The assumption is motivated by the fact that the producer of a Broadway show rents the theatre in which the show is performed and makes no physical changes to the auditorium. 29
As with most multi-product monopoly problems in which the demand for each product is interdependent, it is hopeless to solve for an analytic solution to the firm's optimization problem except in unrealistically simple cases such as discrete consumer types or a uniform density of consumer types. The problem is further complicated by the stochastic value of the outside alternative. 30 Nevertheless, the problem is easily solved using numerical methods.
I consider two benchmark scenarios for comparison with the counterfactual experiments:
Base-A Using the empirical prices, the model provides a prediction of consumer behavior, which yields a measurement of total net utility for all performances. As indicated in Table 5 , the measure of total utility in this case is 3.59 (units are meaningless). The associated predicted total income is $6.27 million, and predicted average attendance is 906.9. Because of the discrepancy in predicted attendances from actual attendances, relative comparisons will be the most meaningful. In Table 5 , the prices which are shown for Base-A are the average prices in each of the categories. These prices fluctuate according to the three pricing regimes as previously explained.
Base-B
The prices in Base-A are the empirical prices. In contrast, in Base-B the firm chooses optimal prices, based upon the estimated demand system and the firm's optimization problem described above. While the firm in fact uses three pricing regimes over time, I assume here that the same price menu is used for every performance. Since the actual pricing policy of the firm does not change over time, this assumption is a reasonable approximation for a benchmark scenario. As occurs in the industry, I assume the booth ticket price is 50% of the full-price high quality ticket price (p b = .5p h ). 31 It is also assumed the firm has perfect foresight of all explanatory variables (including advertising expenditures, the outcome of the Tony Awards and the total number of performances, T ).
The counterfactuals concern alternative assumptions as to how much flexibility the firm has 29 The problem I analyze is equivalent to the first stage of the nonlinear pricing problem addressed in Rosen and Rosenfield (1997) . 30 See Rochet and Stole (1999) for an analysis of monopoly nonlinear pricing where consumers have random participation constraints. 31 The service charge imposed by the booth of $2.50 per ticket is also included.
in setting the price menu. In calculating the welfare effects for consumers (of the counterfactual pricing regime relative to either base case) I take into account the utility obtained by those consumers who choose the outside alternative. Depending on the details of each experiment, emphasis is placed on comparisons with either of the above base-case scenarios. Table 5 shows the predicted optimal prices and the associated income and utility under Base-B. There is no a-priori reason why predicted prices should equal (or even be close to) the observed prices-there was no restriction in the estimation that predicted prices equal actual prices, or any other pricing assumption that would drive such an outcome at this stage. Base-B shows that the estimated demand system combined with the model of firm behavior actually yields predicted prices that are very close to the average actual prices. For this reason I conclude the model is well specified for the counterfactual simulations.
Uniform
In this experiment the firm is restricted to selling all tickets for all performances at a single price. In particular, there are no booth sales and no coupons. As shown in Table 5 the optimal price in this case is $50.04. Relative to Base-B attendance drops by 6.3% and utility rises by a trivial amount. Apparently the improvement in utility for people who were paying higher prices before marginally outweighs the loss for people who either pay more or switch to the outside alternative. In addition to these effects there is a new allocation of seat-qualities in the theatre, which is good for some people and bad for others. The best seats in the house are now more attractive due to the lower price, while the worst seats in the house are likely to be filled only by people who have a high taste level for the play. The most surprising result, however, is that total income is higher, albeit by only 0.6%. How is it that uniform pricing leads to higher income than discriminatory pricing? The answer is related to the booth. Under uniform pricing there is no booth which can undermine the firm's ability to sell tickets at the full-price of $50.04. This suggests the booth is not an optimal mechanism for selling tickets, as might be predicted by the Coase conjecture. The next three experiments examine this issue more closely.
No-Booth-A
In this experiment the firm uses the empirical prices, with the only modification that no booth tickets are sold. Note that the listed prices in Table 5 for this experiment are the same as for Base-A. Comparing the results with Base-A, income has risen by 7.3%, and attendance has decreased by 3.7%. The difference in utility is negligible.
No-Booth-B
As with the experiment No-Booth-A, there are no tickets sold via a discount booth. In this case, however, the firm re-optimizes the prices of the remaining categories. The useful comparison is now with Base-B. Again, income rises, this time by 5.7%.
Unlike the previous experiment, attendance rises this time by just over 1%. In effect the absence of the booth causes the firm to lower the price on the expensive tickets which has a positive effect on attendances. On the basis of these two experiments it is concluded the 50% discount booth tickets are more damaging to firm profits than beneficial. However, this leaves open the question of a booth discount other than 50%, which is addressed in the next experiment.
Booth-Not-50%
In this experiment the firm optimally chooses all ticket prices, including the booth ticket price. The firm is not restricted to selling booth tickets at 50% of the high quality price. As indicated in Table 5 the firm chooses a higher price for booth tickets. The booth price is now approximately 70% of the high quality ticket price. Income is now 7% higher than in Base-B, and attendance is 1.6% lower. In addition, income is also now higher than under uniform pricing by approximately 5%. Therefore, in principle the booth is an optimal mechanism for selling tickets, though the discount appears to be too high from the firm's point of view. For consumers there is also a benefit from raising the price of booth tickets. Since the firm now lowers the high quality price, the net effect on consumers is not detrimental. Indeed, total utility rises by less than 0.5%. One may note, however, the change amounts to a transfer from less wealthy people to more wealthy people.
Non-Sticky
A curious feature of behavior in the Broadway theatre industry is the extent to which prices are sticky. While understanding this phenomenon is an entire research agenda in itself, it is interesting to see how much better off the firm would be in this model if prices could be costlessly adjusted for each performance. In this experiment I return to the restriction that booth tickets are sold at 50% off the price of a high quality ticket and I allow the firm to optimally choose the remaining prices for each individual performance. The appropriate benchmark is Base-B. The prices shown in Table 5 are the average prices for each of the ticket categories. As shown in Table 5 , income is increased by only 1.6%. This is less than the gain from altering the booth discount. A possible explanation for why the improvement is so small might be that the price menu is, in some sense, robust to demand fluctuations. In other words, moderate demand volatility leads to changes in the relative sales of different ticket types which may imply the potential gain from re-optimizing the price schedule is small, and may even be outweighed by the cost of doing so.
Conclusion
The data in this study highlights the lengths that a firm can go to in order to sell their product at different prices to different people. The theoretical model formalizes how the firm in question is able to sustain such an array of prices by incorporating several kinds of price discrimination into a single framework, designed to represent the example of Broadway theatre ticket sales.
The main results stem from experiments into alternative pricing policies. I find that uniform pricing, relative to the existing price discrimination policy, implies lower overall attendances for the play without significantly altering the total consumer surplus. This suggests the apparent lack of concern by anti-trust enforcement agencies for price discrimination in final goods sale may be well-founded.
I find that due to the effect of the discount booth enticing some individuals to not purchase full-price tickets, removal of the booth under uniform pricing does not reduce total revenue. But this is not to say that booth ticket sales are suboptimal. The common practice of Broadway producers has been to sell tickets through the TKTS booth at a 50% discount. According to my experiments, the producer of Seven Guitars would have increased revenue by approximately 7%
if the discount were only 30%. 32 As a measure of the gain to the firm from price discrimination, based on a 30% booth discount, revenue is approximately 5% higher than under uniform pricing.
32 This is the only result in the paper which may be interpreted as an indication that the observed pricing may not be optimal. The general presumption underlying the analysis is that the observed behavior is indeed optimal, and the goal is to understand why. "No. Non-Zero" refers to the number of performances in which tickets were sold for each category.
"Two-fer one" are two-for-one coupon sales.
"TKTS" are tickets sold via the day-of-performance discount booths.
"MTC" stands for Manhattan Theater Club which is a subscriber organization.
"AENY" stands for Arts Entertainment New York which is private firm specializing in providing high quality tickets to its customers.
"TDF" stands for Theater Development Fund which is a non-profit organization that provides tickets to school children and so forth.
In the model, "coupons" are the aggregation of all discount-price categories except TKTS, wheelchair and complimentary tickets. Data from The League of American Theatres and Producers (1991) .
Income is measured in November 1990 dollars.
Estimated parameters are for the underlying normal distribution of the log-normal distribution of income. Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are in brackets. The following normalizations were applied: q l = 1, ηo = 1, po = 0 and α = 0.01.
Advertising is a moving average over the previous 28 days. Cells for price elasticities are the percentage change in demand for the row product, in response to a 1% increase in the price of the column product(s).
The column for "high and booth" is for simultaneous price increases of high quality full-price tickets and booth tickets (because booth tickets are always sold at 50% off the price of high quality full-price tickets). The shown prices are the average prices across all performances. For some experiments, prices do not change from performance to performance, for others they do. Again, see Section 5 for explanations of each experiment.
The figure for average actual attendance does not include wheelchair tickets, standing room, and complimentary tickets. If these categories are included the average actual attendance is 707. 
